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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: CLOSING THE DOOR ON
JUVENILE DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES
Thomas Garrity+
It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.1
- Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
The precise moment when a person becomes an “adult” has been, is, and will
likely continue to be a topic of heated debate in American society. Oft-repeated
talking points revolve around the proper age for those activities that society
deems to be “adult” in nature: drinking, smoking, voting, driving, gun
ownership, contracting—the list goes on ad infinitum. In general, though, the
United States Government, as well as the American people, assign a special
weight to achieving the age of eighteen. Eighteen is the age of enfranchisement,
and, if male, the age at which one must sign up for the draft. It is unlikely that
the choosing of age eighteen as the turning point for “adulthood” is an
endorsement by the government, or other institutions, of any theory that there is
a special significance to arrival at that age. Rather, out of sheer practicality,
there must be a point at which a line is drawn. The consensus, at least in the
United States, places that line at age eighteen.2 But what effect does this concept
have when merged into the context of American Constitutional law, particularly
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments?
The Framers of the United States Constitution, out of a particular trepidation
towards powerful national government, paid special attention to the protection
of the people from unreasonable governmental intrusion or governmental
restriction of individual liberty.3 Integral in this endeavor was the debate over
+

J.D., Magna Cum Laude, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2020;
B.A., Magna Cum Laude, University of Pennsylvania, 2016. I would like to thank Assistant United
States Attorney Susan “Zeke” Knox for her invaluable expertise and help in drafting of this
Comment. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review
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1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
2. See Determining the Legal Age to Consent to Research, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN
ST. LOUIS (July 26, 2012), https://hrpo.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/5-DeterminingLegal-Age-to-Consent.pdf. Note that the legal age of majority is also eighteen in the lion’s share
of other countries listed within this document. Id. Additionally, those U.S. states and countries
that do not place the age of majority at eighteen often place their chosen age of majority within one
to two years of age eighteen. Id.
3. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND.
L.J. 759, 785 (1994).
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the bill of rights and the amendments contained therein. For the purposes of this
Comment, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution shall be the sole focus.
The language of the Eighth Amendment is short and deceptively simple. It
reads: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”4 Narrowing in further, the final six
words of the Amendment give rise to a litany of interpretive challenges.
Foremost among them and bearing strongly on the issue studied in this
Comment, is the methodology by which the ban on cruel and unusual
punishments is bent and molded to accommodate the state imposition of
“adulthood”—at least “adulthood” as a matter of law.
A circuit split has arisen from recent Supreme Court decisions in Roper v.
Simmons,5 Graham v. Florida,6 and Miller v. Alabama.7 These cases hold that
capital punishment and life without parole (LWOP) are cruel and unusual as
applied to juvenile nonhomicidal offenders categorically and as applied to
juvenile homicidal offenders without consideration of youth as a mitigating
factor. The issue is that the Supreme Court has failed to provide guidance as to
whether a de facto life sentence without parole—one in which the defendant is
sentenced to “[a] term-of-years sentence without parole that meets or exceeds
[his] life expectancy”—qualifies as cruel and unusual for Eighth Amendment
purposes.8 Of the federal circuits that have addressed it, the majority have
resolved this issue by stating that a de facto life sentence without parole is the
functional equivalent of standard LWOP sentences, thereby invoking Graham
and Miller and holding them unconstitutional.9 However, other courts have held
that de facto LWOP stands as an exception to the categorical ban on LWOP for
juveniles found in Graham and the presumption against such sentences found in
Miller.10 Until the circuit split is resolved, the chance that a juvenile offender
may be released before his life expectancy has run its course depends largely on
where he was standing when the offense was committed.
This circuit split has real-world implications, and with newly-appointed
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, the issue stands ripe for review. Speaking at
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
7. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
8. United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2018).
9. See id. at 146 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders that are not incorrigible.”); see also Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1191 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that a sentence of 254 years and four months without parole eligibility until having
completed a total of 127 years and two months is the functional equivalent of LWOP and is
irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent banning juvenile LWOP); Budder v. Addison, 851
F.3d 1047, 1050, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a 155 year sentence without parole until
eighty-five percent completion (131.75 years) for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment).
10. See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that a 600month sentence for a juvenile offender is not proscribed by Supreme Court precedent and within
the discretionary sentencing power of the District Courts).
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a purely practical level, without guidance on the proper methodology for
sentencing, judges across the country may be crafting sentences for juvenile
offenders that will later become vulnerable to collateral attack—potentially
clogging the courts with years’ worth of appeals or re-sentencing hearings.
Public perception of inconsistency within the courts, especially on an issue as
emotionally charged as placing a juvenile in prison for the remainder of his or
her lifetime, plants the seeds for claims of overreaching and advantageous use
of “loopholes,” threatening judicial legitimacy. In such politically tumultuous
times as today, the chance to provide clarity and affirm the legitimacy of the
courts lends itself to the importance of resolving this split.
This Comment presents a solution to the circuit split based upon concerns of
practicality and closure of a loophole, arguing for the majority approach. This
approach is framed mostly away from a stance of morality and will not try to tug
at the reader’s heartstrings; rather, this Comment seeks to propose a solution to
a problem now-existing, grounded in a context of practicality and consistency.
The Comment will proceed as follows. Part II will outline the string of decisions
that gave rise to the distinction between adult and juvenile offenders under the
Eighth Amendment. Part III will detail the circuit split and the merits of each
approach taken by the minority and the majority of the circuits, offering review
and critique of each. Part IV will advocate a resolution of the split and suggest
that the Supreme Court should close the door on de facto life sentences without
parole, reinforcing its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of the courts below.
Part V will offer a brief conclusion.
I. BOTTOM OF THE EIGHTH: CARVING OUT THE JUVENILE NICHE
A. The First Brick in the Wall: Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the realm of creating a categorical
standard for juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishment clause was during the early 2000s with its decision in Roper
v. Simmons.11 Up until this point, challenges to sentences of death were
reviewed on an individual basis under a proportionality test. 12 In the 2005

11. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Simmons was charged with several nonhomicidal and homicidal
offenses committed while he was a juvenile. Id. at 557. “The State charged Simmons with
burglary, kidnaping, stealing, and murder in the first degree.” Id. “The jury recommended the
death penalty after finding the State had proved each of the three aggravating factors submitted to
it. Accepting the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge imposed the death penalty.” Id. at 558.
After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that capital
punishment was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied to the mentally retarded,
Simmons sought postconviction relief under a theory that Atkins’ rule should be applicable also to
juveniles due to similar concerns over mental capacity and development. Id. at 559.
12. Mark T. Freeman, Comment, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and the
Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 965 (2013). Freeman outlines
this test as follows:
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opinion, drafted by Justice Kennedy, the Court established a categorical ban on
capital punishment for juveniles, regardless of the underlying criminal charge. 13
Justice Kennedy, including in his opinion reference to various psychological and
sociological studies on adolescent development, drew out three distinctions
between juveniles and adults that justified the need for a categorical ban.14 The
distinctions are as follows: first, juveniles tend to lack maturity and are much
more prone to reckless behavior than their adult counterparts; second, juveniles
are more vulnerable to peer pressure and bad influences than adults; third,
juveniles have not had a sufficient amount of time to develop character. 15 These
are the same distinctions that Court would later go on to cite in the majority
opinions of both Graham v. Florida16 and Miller v. Alabama.17
Justice Kennedy was, and in a way remains, the most influential justice in the
area of juvenile sentencing. He authored the majority opinions of both Roper
and Graham and voted in the majority of Miller.18 More importantly, though,
Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in two of these cases, as well as the only
conservative Justice to agree with the Court’s reasoning in Graham.19 Justice
Kennedy’s willingness to step away from the conservative block of the Court on
this issue gave him the singular power to mold precedent. He set the groundwork
in Roper, but Roper was only the first step in a chain of cases that gradually
curtailed state police power and judicial discretion with regard to juvenile
sentencing.
B. The Wall Gets Higher: Expanding Eighth Amendment Prohibition to
LWOP
Rounding out the first decade of the twenty-first century came the Court’s
next step in differentiating juvenile sentencing requirements under the
Constitution. Building off the framework laid by Roper, the Court, in deciding
Graham, expanded its categorical ban to include not only capital punishment,
but also “a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide. A State . . . if it imposes a sentence of life . . . must provide

First, the Court compares the “gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”
Next, if the Court draws an “inference of gross disproportionality,” it compares the
defendant’s sentence with those sentences “received by other offenders in the same
jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.”
Finally, if this comparison “validates an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly
disproportionate,” the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 964–965.
13. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
14. Id. at 569–70.
15. Id.
16. 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
17. 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
18. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 52; Roper, 543 U.S. at 555.
19. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 52; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
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him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release[.]”20 Again relying
on the distinctions laid out in Roper, the Court found that LWOP sentences for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders did not mesh with the Eighth Amendment. In
addition to these distinctions, however, the Court also was keen to note that, at
the time of its decision, the United States was the only nation that imposed
LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders.21 Traditionally, the Court has taken
global consensus into account when assessing Eighth Amendment questions and
the Court did so again here.22 The Court noted that the United States was joined
only by Somalia in its refusal to sign Article 37(a) of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which “prohibits the imposition of ‘life
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.’”23
Unwilling to announce a ban on juvenile LWOP altogether, the Court
restricted its ruling to cover only those juvenile offenders who were convicted
for nonhomicidal crimes. There was a clear recognition that juveniles were
different, at least as far as culpability and sentencing proportionality were
concerned, but there was trepidation as to where to draw the line. The Court
would provide more guidance two years later, this time addressing the issue left
for a different day in Graham: what to do with those juveniles who were
convicted of a homicidal crime.
C. Where It Stands Today: The Current Last Word on Juvenile LWOP
The most recent case to which the Supreme Court granted review, which
addressed the issue of juvenile sentencing and the Eighth Amendment, was
Miller v. Alabama.24 Drawing on its decisions in Roper and Graham, the Miller
Court used a two-part approach to extend its Eighth Amendment precedent. 25
“[O]n one hand, Miller relied on existing rationale that juveniles are
constitutionally different from adults; on the other hand, the Court used adult
death penalty jurisprudence as a comparative springboard to mandate
20. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
Graham was 16 when he committed armed burglary and another crime. Under a plea
agreement, the Florida trial court sentenced Graham to probation and withheld
adjudication of guilt. Subsequently, the trial court found that Graham had violated the
terms of his probation by committing additional crimes. The trial court adjudicated
Graham guilty of the earlier charges, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to life in
prison for the burglary. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, the life sentence
left Graham no possibility of release except executive clemency. He challenged his
sentence under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause . . . .
Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 80.
23. Id. at 81.
24. 567 U.S. at 465.
25. Amanda Huston, Comment, Jurisprudence vs. Judicial Practice: Diminishing Miller in
the Struggle Over Juvenile Sentencing, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 561, 564 (2015).
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individualized consideration of youthfulness when imposing the harshest
sentences, such as life without the possibility of parole.”26 The ultimate holding
of Miller was that juvenile status must be taken into account as a mitigating
factor when sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, and that mandatory
sentencing guidelines that require LWOP for such offenders are
unconstitutional.27 The Court extended its rationale to include not only the
ultimate sentence handed down by a judge, but also the process followed in
reaching that sentence and the guidelines to which the judge adhered during said
process.28
Miller’s holding was comparatively narrow in scope relative to Roper and
Graham and did not offer a sweeping categorical ban; however, it did lay the
groundwork for how courts should interpret disputes over juvenile sentencing in
general.29 The path that the Court was taking should have become clear. With
each decision, the Court was curtailing the severity of sentences meted out to
juvenile defendants and questioning the legitimacy of one of the harshest
sentences in the states’ toolbox that was still available for use: LWOP sentences.
However, the issues left unaddressed by the Court in Miller have caused—and
continue to cause—disagreement among the federal circuits and the various
States.30 One area of particular disagreement is in the area of “virtual” or “de

26. Id. Huston goes on to comment about the broader applicability of Miller’s holding stating,
[w]hile Miller’s narrow holding only invalidated mandatory life without parole as
applied to juveniles, the Court’s broader rationale is applicable in most juvenile
sentencing hearings. If juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, sentencing
structures must reflect this principle; an offender’s youthful status should be used to
mitigate on behalf of the juvenile sentence.
Id. at 564–565 (emphasis added).
27. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
28. Id. The full language of the Court’s holding is as follows:
Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge
or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of
homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their
age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory
sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Id.
29. Huston, supra note 25, at 564–65.
30. See Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De
Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3439, 3441–42 (2014). Scavone notes that,
[S]tate courts have dealt with the question of lengthy term-of-years sentences given to
both nonhomicide and homicide juveniles that are essentially synonymous with LWOP
sentences, given the young age of the offenders. These lengthy term-of-years sentences
constitute virtual or de facto LWOP sentences that may pose the same constitutional
questions for juveniles as mandatory LWOP sentences.
Id. See also Huston, supra note 25, at 565. Huston comments that:
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facto” life sentences—those term-of-years sentences of such a length as to place
the defendant behind bars beyond the average life expectancy.
D. The Dissenters
The dissenters to the majority rules in Roper, Graham, and Miller have
remained markedly consistent. Outside of Justice Robert’s concurrence in the
judgement in Graham, and save that of Justice Kennedy, the conservative block
of the Supreme Court has voted against any curtailing of the sentencing power
of the courts based upon juvenile status.31 The strongest arguments against the
majority holdings were penned by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Dissenting in
Roper, Justice Scalia was quick to point out that the majority relied heavily on
the global consensus against capital punishment for juvenile offenders. 32 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, staunchly claimed
that comparison to international law has no place in American jurisprudence. 33
Weighing heavily on the premise of this Comment is the fact that this staunchest
of dissenters is no longer available to participate in the debate due to his untimely

Despite Miller’s broad applicability, courts have found numerous ways to limit the
application of Miller’s rationale. In any given case, state and circuit courts will make
multiple, incremental decisions that appear reasonable in-and-of-themselves, but which
produce unreasonable, even absurd results in light of Miller’s broad rationale. The effect
of this incremental decision making is a slow dilution of Miller’s profound contribution
to juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. And the practical outcome of diminishing Miller
is that post-Miller courts will continue to make juvenile sentencing indistinguishable
from that of adults.
Id.
31. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 463; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 51 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551–55 (2005). Of note is Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham. There, he
highlights the very focus of this comment: “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito,
J., dissenting). However, when making this point, Justice Alito cites to a sentencing term that falls
outside the respective definition of de facto LWOP. Id. He states, “[i]ndeed, petitioner conceded
at oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of parole ‘probably’
would be constitutional.” Id. Forty years is simply not long enough to implicate a de facto LWOP
sentence. Though the number is hard to pin down, life expectancy for a defendant will likely require
a sentence far longer than forty years to properly implicate de facto LWOP, thereby rendering
Justice Alito’s point here relatively moot for the purposes of his argument.
32. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]undamentally, however, the basic
premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”). This dissent attempts to take the legs out from under
one of the most compelling data points offered by the majority in support of its decision—that the
United States stands among little company in the international community in terms of the severity
of punishment meted out upon juveniles, a point upon which Justice Kennedy places much weight.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 80–81.
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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death in 2016.34 Much can be speculated as to how the Court, with its two new
members, will address this issue on the next pass.35
II. THE DOOR OPENS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT TAKES SHAPE
In the murky waters left after the Miller decision, a circuit split has developed
and continues to widen.36 This split is not one within which the sides are playing
fair—there is a clear majority and minority; however, all it takes is one dissenter
to form a split and many of the circuits have not yet weighed in on the matter.
This holds open the potential for further disparity. The majority “team” consists
of those circuits that seek to preserve consistency and close the door on the
loophole that has developed through the use of de facto LWOP, and the minority
consists of a single hold-out circuit that clings strongly to the rationale of the
dissent in Miller.37
A. Those in Favor: Circuits Advocating Consistency
The Ninth, Tenth, and the Third Circuits have approached this issue from a
position of consistency with Supreme Court case law, each arriving at the
conclusion against de facto LWOP in much the same manner.
1. The Ninth Circuit Weighs In
In Moore v. Biter,38 the Ninth Circuit was the first of the federal circuits to
approach the question of de facto LWOP as the functional equivalent of LWOP.
34. Amy Brittain & Sari Horwitz, Texas Sheriff’s Report Reveals More Details on Supreme
Court Justice Scalia’s Death, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/texas-sheriff-releases-report-on-supreme-court-justice-scalias-death/
2016/02/23/8c0bdb0c-da82-11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html?utm_term=.2125259c8f3d.
35. See infra Part IV B.
36. See infra Part III A, B.
37. See infra Part III A, B.
38. 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013). Moore was convicted of sexually assaulting four women
on four separate occasions. Id. at 1186. Of the counts against him, he was found guilty of twentyfour in total. Id. These included:
[N]ine counts of forcible rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, two counts of
attempted second degree robbery, two counts of second degree robbery, forcible sodomy,
kidnaping with the specific intent to commit a felony sex offense, genital penetration by
a foreign object, and the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The jury found that
Moore also used a firearm while committing his crimes.
Id. The California Department of Youth Authority provided the trial court with reports detailing
Moore’s psychological profile and his potential for rehabilitation:
One staff psychologist, Dr. Mahoney, found that “there is no reason to believe that
[Moore] would not continue to be dangerous well into the future.” The rest of the clinical
staff, however, concluded that: “[Moore] does not appear to be fixed in his antisocial
value system as he displays a sense of motivation to change in overcoming his delinquent
lifestyle.” A casework specialist found that Moore was “severely depressed with a
history of impulsivity and some immaturity” and has “expressed a willingness to
change.”
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The case centered around a defendant who was convicted of a multitude of
nonhomicide crimes committed while age sixteen. 39 Upon conviction he was
sentenced to 254 years and four months in prison.40 Key to the reasoning of the
Court was that the defendant would not be eligible for parole until he served half
of his sentence, or 127 years and two months.41 This sentence effectively
constituted a life sentence without parole, because, as the court noted,
“[defendant] will spend his life in prison because he would have to live to be
144 years old to be eligible for parole.” 42 The Ninth Circuit’s two-part holding
is doubly impactful for the purposes of this Comment.
For the defendant’s sentence—which finalized in 1993— to be attacked using
the new holding from Graham in 2010, the rule must be held to be retroactive
and available for use to attack collaterally the prior sentencing practice. 43 Not
all new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are automatically retroactively
applicable.44 The rules must fit into an exception to be allowed to have
retroactive effect.45 Rules that categorically ban a punishment for a class of
defendants fit into this exception.46 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the rule
announced in Graham did fall under this exception as it: 1) applies to a class
(juvenile nonhomicide offenders), and 2) categorically prohibits a punishment
(LWOP).47 It can be fairly said that the rule in Graham is the exact class of rule
that the Supreme Court had in mind when carving out the above exception.
Confirming this analysis is the Supreme Court’s holding in Montgomery v.
Louisiana,48 which stated that Miller’s remarkably similar ban on mandatory
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicidal offenders was a substantive rule of
constitutional law that has retroactive effect.49 Of import for this Comment is
the potential retroactive application of a ban on de facto LWOP along the same
lines as that applied above.50

Id. The trial court relied on Dr. Mahoney’s report in coming to its sentence. Id. at 1187.
39. Id. at 1186–87.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1187.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1190–91.
44. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception
to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”).
45. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)) (“[A] new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe[.]’”).
46. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).
47. Id. at 1191.
48. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
49. Id. at 736 (“The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional
law. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports with the principles that informed
Teague.”).
50. See infra Part IV A.
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Having established the legitimacy of Graham’s application to the case before
it, the court moved on to the more substantive matter of deciding whether the
defendant’s sentence was “materially indistinguishable” from a LWOP
sentence.51 The court approached the issue from the perspective of the effect on
the defendant rather than the label attached to the sentence. 52 The court stated
that “we cannot ignore the reality that a seventeen year-old sentenced to life
without parole and a seventeen year-old sentenced to 254 years with no
possibility of parole, have effectively received the same sentence. Both
sentences deny the juvenile the chance to return to society.”53 Following this
reasoning, it cannot be said that any term-of-years sentence, without the
possibility of parole, that holds a defendant behind bars beyond average life
expectancy is not, for all intents and purposes, a LWOP sentence. This approach
to the issue, if and when it arrives before the Supreme Court, is likely to be one
of the most effective at achieving the common-sense outcome espoused by this
Comment.
2. The Tenth Circuit Joins the Fray
The next circuit to accept review of a case concerning de facto LWOP was
the Tenth Circuit in Budder v. Addison.54 The defendant in Budder was
convicted of several nonhomicide crimes that were perpetrated while he was a
juvenile (sixteen years old).55 The defendant’s ultimate sentence, after a
modification by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, was 155 years. 56 Due
to the functioning of Oklahoma law, the defendant would not be eligible for
parole until 85% of his sentence had completed, or 131.75 years.57 This
sentence, while technically falling into the category of life with the possibility
of parole, was functionally a life sentence; the court, quoting Graham, stated
that “[t]his sentence means denial of hope . . . . [T]he sentence alters the

51. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191.
52. Id. at 1192.
53. Id.
54. 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017).
55. Id. at 1049. Budder was convicted of assaulting, both physically and sexually, a
seventeen-year-old girl. Id. The jury found him guilty on four counts: “two counts of first degree
rape, one count of assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of forcible oral
sodomy.” Id. For his crimes, Budder was given two LWOP sentences, a sentence of life with
parole eligibility, and a twenty-year sentence to all run consecutively. Id. After the decision in
Graham came down, Budder’s two LWOP sentences were modified to life with parole eligibility
to accommodate for the new categorical ban against LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
Id. at 1050. Pursuant to Oklahoma law, “a prisoner must serve 85% of his sentence before he will
be eligible for parole. For purposes of parole, a life sentence is calculated as 45 years. Thus,
Budder’s sentences are considered to total 155 years, and he must serve 131.75 years before he will
be eligible for parole.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
56. Id. at 1050.
57. Id.
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offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”58
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning very closely mirrors that of the Ninth Circuit’s
above. Again, the court here calls out the courts below as attempting to rely on
semantics for justification of their sentencing practices.59 The court put it rather
bluntly by stating that
[W]e cannot read the [Supreme] Court’s categorical rule as excluding
juvenile offenders who will be imprisoned for life with no hope of
release for nonhomicide crimes merely because the state does not label
this punishment as “life without parole.” The Constitution’s
protections do not depend upon a legislature’s semantic
classifications.60
The Tenth Circuit went a step further, though, and identified the possibility of
an exploitable loophole that must be closed—a proposition that this Comment
seeks to assert as well. The court continued, “[l]imiting the Court’s holding by
this linguistic distinction would allow states to subvert the requirements of the
Constitution by merely sentencing their offenders to terms of 100 years instead
of ‘life.’ The Constitution’s protections are not so malleable.” 61 Employing
harsher and more critical language than its counterpart in the Ninth Circuit, the
court said that “[defendant] received a life sentence [and] . . . [defendant]’s
sentence does not provide him a realistic opportunity for release; he would be
required to serve 131.75 years in prison before he would be eligible for parole.
No fair-minded jurist could disagree with these conclusions.”62
The court identified de facto LWOP for what it is, an attempt to circumvent
the decisions of the Supreme Court and avoid constitutional challenges by
relying on a semantical loophole. The reasoning behind this approach is sound,
at least in this author’s mind, and will likely be persuasive when brought before
the Supreme Court in due time.
3. The Newcomer: The Third Circuit
The most recent circuit to enter the discussion of de facto LWOP was the
Third Circuit in United States v. Grant.63 The defendant was convicted of
various nonhomicidal and homicidal crimes committed before he achieved the
age of eighteen.64 His ultimate sentence was set at sixty-five years without the
58. Id. at 1056 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70
(2010)).
59. Id.
60. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1056.
61. Id. For further discussion of de facto LWOP sentences as a semantical loophole see infra
Part IV A, B.
62. Id. at 1059 (emphasis added).
63. 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018), vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
64. Id. at 135–36. Grant was convicted of conspiracy and racketeering under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), of various drug related charges, as well as a
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possibility of parole.65 Given his age at the time of sentencing, the earliest
possibility for release, with good time credit applied, would have been when the
defendant was seventy-two, an age that the defendant considered to be
concurrent with his life expectancy.66
Much of what the Third Circuit discussed in its opinion was aligned with the
reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits; however, the court took a detour when
considering what is meant by “meaningful opportunity for release” and how to
determine what is truly “meaningful” in terms of release as relative to life
expectancy.67 Before addressing this detour, it is important to note that the court
in Grant unquestioningly confirmed the reasoning of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, even going as far as to call out the Eighth Circuit as the only holdout.68
The Court stated:
The weight of authority supports our conclusion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders
that are not incorrigible. Here, the District Court found that
[defendant] is capable of reform . . . . Under Miller and our holding
today, the District Court’s finding therefore categorically forecloses a
sentence of LWOP, whether de jure or de facto, and requires the
District Court to sentence . . . in a manner that allows for some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.69
The court did not limit its holding to these issues, though. Choosing to dive
deeper into the requirement for meaningful release, the Third Circuit read into
the Graham and Miller conglomerate an additional consideration that builds off
the idea of life expectancy.70 The Third Circuit currently stands alone in this
approach.
The court pointed to the national consensus that retirement should occur at
age sixty-five.71 This closely mirrors another nationally-recognized linefirearms charge. Id. at 134. “The jury returned a partial verdict finding him guilty of the RICO
conspiracy, racketeering, and drug and gun possession counts (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 11), and—
as predicates for the racketeering charge—found that he murdered Mario Lee and attempted to
murder Dion Lee.” Id. at 136. Grant was originally sentenced to “LWOP on the two RICO counts,
a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year
consecutive term of imprisonment on the gun possession count.” Id. Due to the decision handed
down in Miller, which required sentencing to take into account juvenile status, Grant was resentenced as to the two RICO counts, which resulted in his ultimate sentence of sixty-five years
without parole. Id. at 137.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 145–47, 149.
68. Id. at 145–46.
69. Grant, 887 F.3d at 146 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id. at 152.
71. Id. at 151–52 (noting that they, “[w]ithout definitively determining the issue, . . . consider
sixty-five as an adequate approximation of the national age of retirement to date”).
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drawing exercise discussed above; namely, the acknowledgment of “adulthood”
at age eighteen.72 With this age in mind, the court imputed an additional
requirement for sentencing non-incorrigible juvenile offenders within its circuit:
that these individuals “be afforded an opportunity for release before the national
age of retirement.”73 This requirement is not to be hard and fast, rather, it is
categorized by the court as a rebuttable presumption.74 The court noted that the
rebuttable presumption is unlikely to be rebutted with any frequency. 75 This
retirement age release presumption is by far the most tenuous of the holdings
espoused by the majority circuits, and will likely not be able to withstand
scrutiny in the Supreme Court.
B. Those Against: The Outlier Circuit Throwing the Wrench
As of the drafting of this Comment, only one circuit has advocated the
minority position of differentiation between actual and de facto LWOP
sentences. In United States v. Jefferson, the Eight Circuit upheld a sentence of
600 months (50 years) for a defendant convicted of various nonhomicidal and
homicidal crimes.76 In the shortest of the opinions so far addressed in this
Comment, the Court in Jefferson pursued a rather hardline approach to its
rationale, arguing that because the Miller court did not place a categorical ban
on LWOP for juvenile homicidal offenders, that the district courts should be free
to sentence as they please, even if only nominally taking into account the
mitigating factors of youth when meting out their sentences.77 It is important to
note that, procedurally in this case, the defendant was re-sentenced—the life
sentence originally handed down was replaced with the one at issue: a 600 month
sentence.78 It can easily be understood that the court, in handing down this
sentence, was aware that the sentence was not changing in actual effect, but
rather only in name/categorization.
72. See Determining the Legal Age to Consent to Research, supra note 2.
73. Grant, 887 F.3d at 152.
74. Id.
75. Id. (noting that the court “believe[d] that such instances will be rare and unusual”).
76. 816 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2016). Jefferson was convicted of conspiracy to commit
as well as the actual commission of various drug related offenses and with various murders. Id. at
1017. “[A] federal jury convicted Jefferson of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine;
two substantive drug trafficking offenses in 1997; the firebombing murder of five young children
in February 1994, when Jefferson was sixteen; and the drive-by shooting of a drug debtor and an
innocent bystander in February 1995, when Jefferson was seventeen.” Id. Jefferson was originally
sentenced to life in prison under mandatory sentencing guidelines, but after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller, his sentence was vacated, and he was re-sentenced to the 600-month term at
issue in the instant case. Id. at 1017–18.
77. Id. at 1018–19. The court specifically notes that “the Supreme Court in Miller did not
categorically bar discretionary decisions to impose life sentences on juveniles, the Court ruled that
a sentencing court must make ‘individualized sentencing decisions’ that take into account ‘the
distinctive attributes of youth’ before it imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile.” Id.
at 1019 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 472 (2012)).
78. Id. at 1018.
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By relying on the minutiae and particularities of the Miller opinion and
allowing the sentence to stand, the Eighth Circuit, here, chose to ignore the
greater theme that has emerged from recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. There
is a very clear movement toward lowering sentencing harshness and accounting
for, as Justice Kennedy put it, the “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” that
accompanies youth and actions taken thereby. 79 The Eight Circuit places itself
out in the cold, standing alone against a growing majority that has found and
implemented the crux of the motivation behind Roper, Graham, and Miller:
“[I]mposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot
proceed as though they were not children.”80
III. CLOSING THE DOOR: ADVOCATING FOR AN END TO THE DE FACTO LWOP
LOOPHOLE
A. Practically Speaking
In advocating the majority approach, this Comment seeks to separate the
emotive from the pragmatic. While there is much to be said about societal values
and the horrors that can be conjured up by setting the scene of throwing away
the key, much can also be said about the genuine, hard-numbers costs and
burdens that this circuit split is causing, as well as the potential for further costs
were the minority view to take hold.
Delving first into the topic of the potential burden on the court system, every
court that enacts a de facto LWOP sentence is opening the door to the possibility
of appeal and for further hearings before the court or other state bodies. Key to
its decision in Moore, the Ninth Circuit performed a Teague analysis to
determine whether the rule announced in Graham was retroactively applicable. 81
In order to fall under the Teague exception, as explained by the court in Moore,
the new substantive constitutional law must apply to a class of defendants and
place a particular punishment out of reach.82 If one were to imagine that the
Supreme Court has espoused the majority opinion with regard to de facto LWOP
and identified it as materially indistinguishable from LWOP for Eighth
Amendment purposes, one can see that the new rule would fit quite comfortably
into the Teague framework. To begin with, as the Court announced in both
Graham and Miller, the rule would be applicable to a class—namely: juvenile
nonhomicidal offenders, juvenile homicidal offenders, or both.83 Next, the rule
79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
80. Miller, 567 U.S. at 461–62.
81. Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2013).
82. Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330 (1989)).
83. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive
lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related
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would either prohibit the legislature from enacting mandatory sentencing
guidelines requiring de facto LWOP or remove the availability of those
sentences from a judge’s discretion, thereby foreclosing a punishment from
“criminal law-making authority.”84 Having determined that any new rule
announced with regard to de facto LWOP would be retroactively applicable, it
is not a leap to imagine the great burden and financial cost that such a rule would
have in those jurisdictions that have embraced the minority approach.
Juvenile offenders would (metaphorically) flock in droves to the gates of the
courts that have handed down now-unconstitutional de facto LWOP sentences.
Restricting the scope of the argument to the federal system, there is still potential
for huge costs, both on the private party making the appeal and the government’s
defense thereof. While there is no way to pin down an actual number for the
costs of an appeal in these type of cases, appellate review can give rise to an
increase in cost.85 This places a burden on the appellant as well as the taxpayer
who is footing the bill for the cost of the government’s defense of the appeal.
This is not to mention the strain on the already-overburdened dockets of the
courts.86 Those jurisdictions that subscribe to the minority approach are opening
characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate
this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.”) (emphasis added); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding “[t]he
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who
did not commit homicide”) (emphasis added).
84. Moore, 725 F.3d at 1190 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
85. Solomon L. Wisenberg, Federal Criminal Appeals, SOLOMAN L. WISENBERG,
https://www.wisenberglaw.com/White-Collar-Criminal-Defense/Federal-Criminal-Appeals.shtml
(last visited June 4, 2020). As this FAQ points out, the costs of a federal criminal appeal are very
case specific, and the complexity of each case has a large impact on both the amount of time and
resources required for the appeal. Id. There are a few costs that can be expected at the outset, such
as the filing fee of $455 as well as the transcript which costs, not uncommonly, over $5000. Id.
Add to this the cost of retaining counsel and the billable hours and the numbers continue to grow.
Id.
86. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where
Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b. The author explains the
current situation in the federal court system as to the surplus of vacancies and the chronic
overworking that is plaguing many federal judges:
For many district and circuit court judges, going to work means doing their job—
plus the jobs of other judges who are supposed to be there, but aren’t. That’s because
federal courts are full of vacancies that aren’t being filled by the Senate, and Congress
hasn’t created new judgeships in many states for decades, despite skyrocketing caseloads.
Litigants are waiting years for their civil cases to be heard because criminal cases
take precedence. Judges are struggling with burnout. And many courts are relying on
semi-retired judges just to stay afloat.
Id. The author goes on to explain that the national average caseload for a federal judge is between
500-600 cases per year; however, there are some districts where the average rises as high as 1000
per year per judge. Id. These numbers are unsustainable now and adding the potential for a huge
influx of new criminal appeals or re-sentencing hearings is throwing fuel on an already out of
control blaze.
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themselves up to the potential of swelling their dockets with new criminal
matters—matters that could have been settled previously through issuing
sentences aligned with trending Supreme Court case law—at the expense of their
civil dockets.87
The Supreme Court has attempted to quell concerns about this very issue. In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, argued that
retroactive applicability of Miller would not cause an “onerous burden on the
States.”88 It can be argued, though, that this claim overly minimized the actual
costs associated with retroactive applicability. Justice Kennedy suggested that
the States can remedy the issue “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to
be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” 89 He then cited a
Wyoming statute that permits juvenile homicide offenders to be eligible for
parole after twenty-five years as an example.90 Important though is that passing
of legislation by the states is still a procedure that places costs on the taxpayer. 91
Additionally, what is to prevent a legislature from passing a law that comports
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, but still puts the prospect of
release at such a long distance away (say Justice Alito’s chosen forty years) that
the juvenile offender chooses to appeal anyway? There is no way to know this
for certain, but the thought exercise remains relevant.
From a practical perspective, the minority position adopted by the Eighth
Circuit carries the risks outlined above, while the majority approach does not.
In jurisdictions where the judges themselves have determined the functional
equivalency of de facto and de jure LWOP, state legislatures need not concern
themselves with new legislation and juvenile offenders have already been
provided with the hope for meaningful release that drives those in the minority
jurisdictions to appeal.
B. A Consistent and Legitimate Approach
Today, society in America is perhaps more fractured than it has been for quite
some time, but this is nothing new to the American people. 92 The courts, by
their very nature, ought to be a bastion of stability among the current turbulent

87. Id. The author provides a poignant quote from Judge Morrison England Jr., the chief
judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California: “What happens is you have
to keep pushing civil cases further out. They’ve already been waiting sometimes three to four years
. . . I get concerned when cases are so old. Memories are fading; people are no longer around. It’s
not serving anyone trying to get justice.” Id. Adding to this already astounding backup with
superfluous cases is serious cause for pause when considering the merits of the minority approach.
88. 136 S. Ct. 718, 725, 736 (2016).
89. Id. at 736.
90. Id.
91. See Jake Griffin, Why Legislators Rarely Know Cost of Laws They Pass, DAILY HERALD
(Feb. 8, 2012, 5:31 AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20120208/news/702089933/.
92. See Joanne B. Freeman, The Violence at the Heart of Our Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/opinion/sunday/violence-politics-congress.html.
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sea of political animosity.93 Splits in the federal circuits—particularly on issues
that the average American can readily relate to—pose a great risk to the
perception of the courts as legitimate, stability-enhancing institutions. It is not
untoward to imagine that issues such as life sentences for juveniles, and the
manner in which they are imposed, are more readily available as a topic to the
average American than say imprudent behavior of a fiduciary as it relates to loss
under ERISA to a plan participant.94 Juvenile life sentences feel more tangible
than the latter.
The Supreme Court has, for nearly three decades, been marching forward with
the curtailment of the sentencing power of judges and legislatures as relates to
juvenile offenders.95 Those courts that have chosen to ignore this development
and have allowed the usage of de facto LWOP sentences can be argued to be
detracting from the legitimacy of the courts, at the very least in the eyes of the
public. John C. McCoid, II, observed in a 1991 article on the topic of
inconsistent judgements that “[i]t is sometimes argued that, when inconsistency
reveals the occurrence of error, that manifestation of fallibility saps public
confidence in the adjudicatory process and that inconsistency is thus harmful
simply because of its signal.”96 This “signal” created by error is strengthened

93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 422, 431–32 (1988). Judge Easterbrook is keen to point out that more recent decisions by the
Court in constitutional matters are not as impactful as those that are longstanding, but this does not
foreclose on their impact entirely. Id. He says of these decisions:
They still have widespread effects on planning. Take Miranda v. Arizona, which the
court unanimously reaffirmed a few years ago even though a majority of the sitting
Justices probably would not have thought the doctrine attractive as a matter of first
principles. Miranda has become a structural decision on which other doctrines and
institutions depend. For example, to the extent Miranda makes it harder to obtain
convictions, courts respond by increasing the sentences of those who are convicted, so
as to keep general deterrence constant. The higher sentence levels are built into the
guidelines that control sentencing in federal courts, and into the penalty structures of state
law. One could not change Miranda without being prepared to rethink criminal
sentences.
Id. One can hope that this is the approach followed by the Court when it gets its next pass on
juvenile sentencing reform—while the new Justices may not have agreed with the doctrine had they
been seated upon first review of the issue, the engraining of the Court’s holding has taken place
and reaffirming would likely seem to be a necessity at this point in time.
94. See generally Brotherston v. Putnam Invs., LLC, 907 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2018). This case
is brought up only for use in the hypothetical presented in the body of the text.
95. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–
53, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 838 (1988).
96. John C. McCoid, II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 488 (1991).
There is an argument to be made that the public is more willing to accept honest mistakes and errors
than many commentators have espoused in their research, and one such argument is made by
McCoid in his article. See id. at 488–91. However, the basis of McCoid’s claim is that the errors
were perceived by the public as “honest mistakes” and “failures” with no reference to deliberate
choice to ignore precedent. Id. at 488. This fundamental difference in the type of error and the
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when the error is not one of mere fallibility, but one of wanton disregard for the
precedent laid down by the Supreme Court. Consistency is key to the function
of our court system.97 McCoid went on to frame the issue in the following way:
“Like cases should be treated alike: This formula of Aristotle is widely accepted
as a core element of egalitarian moral and social philosophy . . . . That is,
consistency prescribes like treatment for successive cases governed by the same
rule of law or morality.”98 How can it be that the location in which an offender
was standing while he committed his crimes can be allowed to be the deciding
factor in whether he will have a chance for release? This, though, is the current
reality of the juvenile offender in the federal system and will remain so until this
circuit split is resolved.
In resolving this split, the Supreme Court should continue to honor its own
precedent, but that outcome is nowhere near certain. Since the last pass at the
issue of juvenile sentencing in Miller, the composition of the court has changed
markedly. Justice Scalia, one of the most ardent dissenters in the juvenile
sentencing cases referenced in this Comment, has unfortunately passed; his
vacancy on the Court has been filled by Justice Gorsuch.99 In addition, Justice
Kennedy, the swing voter on this issue, has retired and been replaced by Justice
Kavanaugh.100 How these two new Justices will weigh in on this issue cannot
yet be determined with any certainty, but there are some indications that Justice
Kavanaugh may follow in the footsteps of his predecessor. 101 For the sake of
consistency and maintaining legitimacy in the public eye, this Comment
suggests that Justice Kavanaugh do so.
signal that it sends to the public renders McCoid’s analysis about public perception inapplicable to
the inconsistency created by the circuit split on de facto LWOP sentences.
97. This is not to say that every judgement handed down by a trial judge must maintain perfect
parity in every case for every defendant convicted of the same crime. Sentencing is a highly
nuanced practice that considers specific mitigating and aggravating factors, unique to each
defendant. See John E. Coons, Consistency., 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 87 (1987) (noting, “[t]he appeal
to the values of individual judges is a reality of advocacy at every level of litigation”). Rather, the
type of consistency espoused in this comment is for the overarching theme of the law. At the heart
of the issue of this comment is not whether the defendant was sentenced to sixty-five years and
another to seventy, the focus is that de facto LWOP should be classified as materially
indistinguishable from de jure LWOP because to fail to do so would provide trial judges with access
to a loophole—a loophole that opens the door to the type of inconsistency that threatens judicial
legitimacy. See id. at 87–88, 92.
98. Id. at 59–60.
99. Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neilgorsuch-supremecourt.html.
100. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh is Sworn in After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaughsupreme-court.html.
101. See Rory Little, Judge Kavanaugh’s Record in Criminal Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 27,
2018, 1:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-criminalcases/. Of particular interest are Kavanaugh’s stances on federal sentencing guidelines and his
often “pro-defense” opinions. Id.
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As Judge Easterbrook notes in his article on stability in judicial decisions,
readiness to overrule constitutional cases threatens the very process of
constitutional change.102 He states that such overruling “reduces the stability of
governmental institutions, denying the polity the benefit . . . of continuity. Not
coincidentally, it saps the drive for change in the constitutional text. People who
seek amendment know that the Court may change the rules at any moment,
making their campaign unnecessary or even counterproductive . . . .”103
Additionally, such action has far-reaching impact outside of just the
constitutional context. For example:
[I]t does not take much argument to demonstrate that ready alteration
of constitutional rules makes the effects of statutes and private
bargains less predictable. So although I do not quarrel with the
proposition that the Court ought to inter recent mistakes before they
do serious damage, I doubt that judges should be any more ready to
unravel long-standing constitutional doctrines than they should be to
revise long-standing statutory interpretations. Indeed, things should
work the other way. Precisely because constitutional rules establish
governmental structures, because they are the framework for all
political interactions, it ought to be harder to revise them than to
change statutory rules. The reasons for making amendment hard apply
as well to overrulings.104
It can be argued that such effects will not be lost on Justice Kavanaugh, and this
author, for one, hopes that they are not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than turning its back on thirty years of development around juvenile
sentencing, it is time for the Supreme Court to honor its precedent. When the
issue of de facto LWOP presents itself before the Court—either in a juvenile
homicidal offender or juvenile nonhomicidal offender context—the Court
should resolve the split in the manner most conducive to consistency and
legitimacy while also keeping an eye on pragmatic concerns. The majority
opinion amongst the circuits—that de facto LWOP is materially
indistinguishable from de jure LWOP for Eighth Amendment purposes—is
exactly that. Each approach has its merits, but the majority circuits have the

102. Easterbrook, supra note 93, 430–31.
103. Id. at 430. Judge Easterbrook counsels that constitutional overruling relies more on moral
judgments than on strictly legal analysis. Id. at 432. He states, “a constitutional overruling depends
on moral and prudential judgments more than strictly legal ones. On the legal side, we can tell that
a given rule has been eroded, but the erosion usually marks a moral or prudential problem.” Id.
The collective morals of the Court, the nation, and the world have spoken on juvenile sentencing,
and these moral judgments speak against overruling Supreme Court case law espousing the same.
See infra notes 105, 106, 107.
104. Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 431.
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stronger case. Theirs is the one that meshes most soundly with national and
global consensus in juvenile sentencing practice.
As was noted at the outset, determination of the exact moment of adulthood
is a guessing game at best. Many unknowable factors combine to create what
society would deem an “adult.” But the Court need not concern itself with this
form of speculation or line-drawing. Let it suffice to say that, wherever that line
ultimately lands, those under the age of eighteen are different and should be
treated as such under the law. This notion has been definitively determined by
the Supreme Court,105 by the American people,106 and by the international
community.107 For the sake of consistency, for the sake of practicality, in
keeping with the legitimacy of the courts, now is not the time to undo all that
has been done before.
Close the loophole. Close the door.

105. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Thompson,
487 U.S. at 838.
106. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67. The Court here noted that the “clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”
Id. at 62 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). The Court concluded that at the
time Graham was decided, “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life without parole
sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—and most of those do so quite rarely—while 26
States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government do not impose them despite statutory
authorization.” Id. at 64. Justice Kennedy pointed to these numbers to espouse a national consensus
against the use of LWOP on juvenile nonhomicidal offenders. Id. at 64–65.
107. Id. at 80. The Court cited to a study which concluded: “only 11 nations authorize life
without parole for juvenile offenders under any circumstances; and only 2 of them, the United
States and Israel, ever impose the punishment in practice. . . .” Id. Additionally, the United States
was an outlier when it came to juvenile LWOP for nonhomicidal offenders. Id. at 80–81. The
Court notes that “even if Israel is counted as allowing life without parole for juvenile offenders,
that nation does not appear to impose that sentence for nonhomicide crimes; all of the seven Israeli
prisoners whom commentators have identified as serving life sentences for juvenile crimes were
convicted of homicide or attempted homicide.” Id.

